Introduction
On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a massive conventional escalation of the War which began in 2014 as a low to medium-level war that lasted until 2016 with the defeat of Ukrainian forces and the loss of the Crimea peninsula and some lands along the border between the two states. By way of contrast, the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the resulting hi-intensity conventional war, which is the biggest and deadliest war in Europe since World War II, has killed tens of thousands on both sides and resulted in immense destruction of property and infrastructure. It has shaken Europe, whose leaders and populace had become accustomed to a pacific continent during the Cold War despite the massive build-up of conventional forces by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact along the famed ‘Fulda Gap,’ and whose people enjoyed a ‘peace dividend’ in the post-Cold War era. This ‘peace dividend’ resulted in a decline of defence budgets and deterioration in military readiness in many European countries. The war in Ukraine has re-focused attention on rebuilding military capabilities and increasing readiness. Contrary to popular belief, the Russo-Ukraine War was not the first large conventional war in Europe since World War II. There was the bloodletting associated with the unravelling of Yugoslavia – a nation-state of three disparate religious but ethnically related groups coexisting uneasily alongside one another until they could no longer do so. However, while the Yugoslav war shocked European sensibilities because of the brutality displayed by all sides, there was a supercilious sentiment that after all, this was the Balkans where such things happened; moreover, the Yugoslav conflict was an internal war of a state that had failed. Efforts were geared to trying to contain the implications and spill-over and to shape the contours of the emerging post-Yugoslavia states.
The Russo-Ukraine War was something of a different magnitude altogether. It went from a relatively low and medium-level war between 2014-2016 to a deadly and costly high-intensity war of attrition, widespread destruction, and atrocities from 2022 to the present. The military analyses that have appeared since February 24, 2022, refer to it as ‘high intensity war’ or in French – as it seems the French have written the most detailed and extensive analyses of this concept – la guerre de haute intensite. It is a term that co-exists uneasily with the term conventional war. Until the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2022 between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Russo-Ukraine War, conventional war as a phenomenon seemed to have been written off as part of our future by many luminaries ranging from General Sir Rupert Smith of the British Army to military historians and peace conflict academics such as Dutch-Israeli Martin Van Creveld and Briton Mary Kaldor respectively.
However, conventional war is back.[1] It accompanies unconventional war in which non-state actors, militias, and proxies play their respective roles in war. What we have seen in recent conventional wars is high and rapid attrition of personnel, material, and munitions. This has been on a scale which has called into question such critical things as supplies, sustainability of forces, will to fight, and national resilience. The war’s domestic impact in Ukraine and Russia has been substantial. Russian forces have been responsible for mass civilian casualties and for torturing captured Ukrainian soldiers. By June 2022, about 8 million Ukrainians had been internally displaced. More than 8.2 million had fled the country by May 2023, becoming Europe’s largest refugee crisis since World War II. Its environmental impact has been on full display. Extensive environmental damage, widely described as ecocide, contributed to food crises worldwide. Its international impact and consequences have been significant in grand strategic and military terms, not least of all in the Indo-Pacific region.
This is a special issue of Security Challenges, and the products will be published online. It is constructed on a ‘rolling basis’ in which papers by individual authors are uploaded as they are completed. This special issue: “Multi-Dimensional Aspects of the Russo-Ukraine War, 2022-Present,” is divided into distinct parts.
Part I will address the origins and causes of the Russo-Ukraine War.